John Stirling’s The Territorial Divisions, 1914-1918 is not a narrative history but a compilation of extracts from published despatches, chiefly those of Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig and General Sir Archibald Murray. Stirling, a former major in the 8th Battalion Royal Scots, explicitly states his method in the introduction: he relies on official reports because “the opinion of units on their own doings would not be quite impartial.” The book thus offers a command-level view of fourteen Territorial infantry divisions, with particular attention to the years 1916 and 1917, when divisional numbers were not named in despatches until the battle of Cambrai in November 1917.

A Documentary Approach to Territorial Service

Stirling’s introduction makes clear that his notes are “very largely composed of extracts, relating to the work of Territorial Infantry Divisions, taken from the published despatches.” He acknowledges that the divisions’ Territorial designations were withheld from despatches in the Gazette until February 1918, but that the Dent edition of Haig’s despatches identified divisions by number—a source he uses with permission. This documentary method means the book is less a continuous story than a curated selection of official judgments. Stirling argues that despatches provide “the best, if not the only reliable, material” for assessing the Territorial Force, deliberately setting aside unit-level accounts as potentially partial. The result is a volume that foregrounds the perspective of army commanders, recording where divisions fought and what generals said of their performance, rather than the experiences of individual soldiers.

Early Deployments and the Question of Readiness

Stirling notes that under the Territorial Act of 1907, fourteen infantry divisions were formed, and all had embarked for abroad by July 1915. He speculates that if armament and invasion concerns had not delayed them, “several divisions might have been in France before the close of the first battle of Ypres,” potentially easing Lord French’s anxieties in November 1914. The excerpts show that four divisions went to the East in autumn 1914, allowing the Indian Corps to be moved to France. By April 1915, Stirling asserts, the Territorial strength in France alone “probably exceeded that of the British Army at Mons,” and he questions whether the Regular and Indian divisions could have withstood the second battle of Ypres without them. These passages reveal Stirling’s argument that the Territorials’ early contribution was underappreciated, though he grounds this claim in deployment timelines and troop numbers rather than battle accounts.

Operations in the Mediterranean and Sinai

The excerpts covering the 53rd Division illustrate the book’s reliance on despatch language. At Suvla Bay in August 1915, the division was ordered to hold the enemy while the 29th and 11th Divisions attacked; the attack “was not successful,” and the troops were evacuated in December. Later, in Egypt, the division fought in the “Battle of Rumani” (August 1916) and the “First Battle of Gaza” (March 1917). Stirling reproduces Sir A. Murray’s detailed description of the approach march, deployment, and assault on Ali Muntar Hill, including the moment when “the whole of the Ali Muntar position had been carried and a footing gained on the ridge.” The account is clinical, noting times, unit movements, and enemy fire, but offers no analysis of casualties or strategic outcome. This pattern—presenting the despatch as the authoritative record—holds throughout the excerpts, making the book a reference for official assessments rather than a critical history.

Readers should approach this book as a sourcebook of command-level evaluations, not a comprehensive operational history. Stirling’s selection of extracts emphasizes battles where Territorial divisions were explicitly named, leaving gaps in coverage for earlier or less documented actions. The absence of unit-level voices means the book cannot convey the experience of the soldiers themselves. For those studying the Territorial Force, it offers a useful digest of how senior commanders framed their service, but it should be read alongside other accounts to gain a fuller picture.